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Abstract  
 
With the hike in gold prices from 2008 onwards, tens of thousands of foreign miners, 
especially from China, entered into the small-scale mining sector in Ghana, despite it being 
‘reserved for Ghanaian citizens’ by law. An astonishing free-for-all ensued in which 
Ghanaian and Chinese miners engaged in both contestation and collaboration over access to 
gold, a situation described as ‘out of control’ and ‘a culture of impunity’. Where was the 
state? This paper addresses the question of how and why this phenomenon of pervasive and 
illicit foreign involvement in small-scale gold mining was able to occur without earlier 
intervention from the state.  Findings indicate that the state was not in fact absent. Foreign 
miners were able to operate with impunity precisely because they were protected by those in 
authority, i.e. public officials, politicians and chiefs, in return for private payments. 
Attempting to explain why various state institutions failed in their responsibilities leads to 
reflection about the nature of the contemporary state in Ghana. It is concluded that the 
informality and corruption characteristic of neopatrimonialism remains predominant over 
legal-rational structures, albeit in a form that has adapted to neoliberal restructuring by an 
increased orientation towards accessing private sector resources and individual wealth 
accumulation. Public office remains a means of private enrichment rather than public service. 
Such findings cast a shadow over the state and government in Ghana, and tarnish its 
celebration as a model of democratic governance for Africa. 
 
Keywords: Artisanal and small-scale mining; Ghana; Chinese miners; the state and 
corruption; neopatrimonialism 
 
1. Introduction 
The global rush to grab mineral resources took an unusual turn in Ghana recently in the 
informal gold mining sector. With the hike in gold prices from 2008 onwards, a large influx of 
foreign miners, especially irregular migrants from China, entered into the artisanal and small-
scale mining sector (ASM), despite it being ‘reserved for Ghanaian citizens’ by law (Minerals 
and Mining Act 2006). An astonishing illicit, free-for-all ensued in which Ghanaian and 
Chinese miners engaged in both conflict and collaboration over access to gold, a situation 
described as ‘out of control’ and characterised by ‘a culture of impunity’ at its height in 2012 
and 2013 (Interview 1). Chinese miners in particular, numbering tens of thousands, 
introduced mechanisation and new technology, resulting in irrevocable changes to this 
traditional economic sector in a short space of time. Further, the intensification of mining 
caused incalculable environmental damage to both land and water bodies. Where was the state 
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in this context, especially given the illegality involved? The government appeared very slow 
to respond, despite increasingly negative media coverage of ‘illegal Chinese miners’ that 
focused on local conflicts between Chinese and Ghanaian miners, resulting in deaths and 
injuries on both sides, and on the large-scale environmental destruction. Finally, on 15 May 
2013, President Mahama established an Inter-Ministerial Task Force aimed at ‘flushing out’ 
illegal miners, a military-style operation with the deportation of 4592 Chinese nationals, 
along with small numbers of other foreign nationals from Russia, Togo and Niger (Modern 
Ghana 12 July 2013).  
 
This article addresses the question of how and why this extraordinary phenomenon of 
pervasive and illicit Chinese involvement in small-scale gold mining in Ghana was able to 
occur, despite its illegality and adverse consequences, without earlier intervention from the 
state.  Findings indicate that the state was not in fact absent pre-Task Force. Foreign miners 
were able to operate with impunity precisely because they were protected by those in 
authority, i.e. public officials, politicians and chiefs, in return for private payments. Various 
state institutions and traditional authority structures thus failed in their responsibilities. Yet 
Ghana is hardly a ‘weak state’ and this failure was not due to lack of capacity. Rather public 
officials ‘turned a blind eye’ to illicit gold mining in return for a share in the “millions of 
dollars being made” at a time of very high gold prices (Interview 6). Public office became a 
means of private wealth accumulation rather than public service.  
 
Thus, corruption emerges at the heart of our empirical findings and, in seeking a broader 
explanation of why this phenomenon of illicit foreign involvement in ASM occurred, it was 
necessary to reflect on the nature of the contemporary state in Ghana. We situate these 
findings, therefore, within theoretical frameworks concerning the state in Africa, namely 
neopatrimonialism and neoliberal state reconstruction. While neopatrimonialism has long 
been associated with informality and corruption and a blurring of public and private interests, 
it was anticipated by the advocates of neoliberal restructuring that such reforms would limit 
opportunities for corrupt activities and weaken patronage politics. Our conclusion is that 
neoliberal restructuring has not weakened the neopatrimonial state in Ghana, but caused it to 
adapt to a changed environment. The state continues to exercise power, notably through 
informal processes, in a manner that enhances the ability of public officials and politicians to 
pursue their private interests, as well as enable private actors to profit even where engaged in 
unlawful activity, at the expense of the public good. The implications for an effective state 
and for policy-making that benefits the majority low-income population are clearly not 
positive. 
 
3 
 
The research took a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser, 1992; Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967), though more by default than design. We became aware of the entry of large 
numbers of foreign miners, especially from China, into the small-scale mining sector through 
the media coverage of local conflicts. We sought funds to investigate and then commenced 
the research without any particular theoretical preconceptions. We undertook interviews with 
government officials in Accra in April 2014, including the Minister responsible for mining, 
and identified a suitable fieldwork location, the Upper Denkyira East Municipality in the 
Central Region, the heartland of alluvial gold mining in southern Ghana and a centre of 
Chinese involvement. Intensive fieldwork was undertaken in July and August 2014, one year 
after the Task Force’s operations. Although the presence of foreign miners was much less by 
then, we were able to gather data on the preceding period and the concerns, issues and 
changes that had emerged during this time. Data collection methods involved semi-structured 
interviews with: government officials at regional and municipal levels; chiefs and local 
politicians at municipal level; local journalists; and Ghanaian small-scale miners. Focus group 
discussions were also held in two mining communities. In addition, visits were undertaken to 
ASM sites, both legal and illegal, to observe mining processes at first hand, including the 
degree of environmental degradation. National level interviews were conducted both prior to 
and after fieldwork to validate the initial findings, including with Chinese citizens resident in 
Ghana. A media review was also undertaken for the period January to September 2013 of key 
stories relating to foreign involvement in ASM. On analysing the data, we identified key 
themes and patterns that emerged from interviews, focus groups and other published 
documents. These included local collaboration with Chinese miners involving artisanal 
miners and chiefs; illegal access to land for mining purposes; circumventing of established 
regulations regarding small-scale mining; official collaboration and protection of illegal 
miners; insidious corruption involving politicians and public officials; and the pursuit of 
private gain at the expense of the public good.  We then considered existing theoretical 
frameworks concerning the state in Africa and their explanatory value in helping to 
understand the social phenomena being investigated. 
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The paper proceeds in six main sections corresponding to this grounded theory approach. 
After this introduction, the second section provides information on small-scale gold mining in 
Ghana, with reference to key literature on ASM in Ghana. The third and fourth sections 
present empirical findings concerning the recent phenomenon of foreign involvement in the 
sector, especially by irregular Chinese miners, and the significant impact of foreign 
involvement on this informal sector. The fifth section attempts to explain why and how the 
illicit grabbing of Ghana’s gold resources was able to occur without earlier state intervention, 
with reference to the interrelated concepts that emerged as crucial to an explanation, namely 
corruption, informality, neopatrimonialism and neoliberal state reconstruction. Finally the 
conclusion highlights what this study, initially about foreign involvement in small-scale 
mining, has revealed about the nature of the contemporary state in Ghana, with findings that 
question the image of Ghana as a model of democratic governance for Africa. 
 
2. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in Ghana 
ASM has been a traditional and indigenous activity for centuries, dated back at least to the 
15th century when mercury was first used in gold extraction (Dummett, 1998; Tsuma, 2010: 
10), one that has continued to use rudimentary means of extraction, at least up to the past 
decade. As in other African countries, ASM takes licensed and unlicensed forms, with the 
latter predominating and such illicit miners in Ghana known as galamsey, an adulterated 
version of the English phrase “gather them and sell” (Aubynn et al., 2010: 3). In 
contemporary times, ASM in Ghana has become an increasingly important means of 
livelihood for many rural dwellers, often turning to mining to supplement or replace farming 
incomes (Jonsson and Fold, 2011: 480; Hilson and Garforth, 2012; Bush 2009). In this section 
we elaborate two key aspects of the legal framework: the distinction between legal and illegal 
mining; and the restriction of mining to Ghanaian citizens.  
 
ASM was formally illegal in Ghana until 1989, although widely practised. The Small-Scale 
Gold Mining Law 1989 (PNDCL 218) legalized and attempted to regulate small-scale mining 
by introducing a registration and licensing process. This was then incorporated into the 
current Minerals and Mining Act 2006 (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2006). This 
formalization process enabled artisanal miners to apply to the Minerals Commission for a 
concession of 25 acres maximum in designated mining areas and then to acquire a licence to 
mine. However, this process is criticized as lengthy, bureaucratic and very expensive, with a 
range of official and unofficial fees. As such, it precludes most low-income miners from 
registering (Tschakert and Singha, 2007: 1306; Tsuma, 2010: 21; Hilson et al., 2014: 297–8), 
and therefore galamsey activities have continued to proliferate. One report states that, out of 
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an estimated 250,000 ASM operators, “less than 30 percent […] are duly registered and 
licensed” (Aubynn et al., 2010: 3). Therefore, the large majority of ASM operators remain 
informal and illicit.  
 
Despite this apparent attempt to formalise and regularise small-scale mining from 1989 
onwards, there is a strong argument that the state has actually neglected the ASM sector for 
decades and simultaneously prioritised the large-scale gold mining sector dominated by 
transnational corporations. Hilson et al. (2014: 298–9) make the case forcefully that the long 
delays in applications for licences, at times taking years, coupled with a lack of state financial 
and technical support to licensed ASM operators, amounts to neglect and maintains the 
sector’s “perpetual informality” (Hilson et al., 2014: 292; see Jonsson and Fold, 2011: 485 for 
similar problems regarding ASM licensing in sub-Saharan Africa generally). Tschakert and 
Singha (2007) also highlight processes of marginalization by the state of the ASM sector in 
Ghana, including the leasing of large areas of land to large-scale mining corporations and the 
criminalization of galamsey. Such processes in their view are “in stark contrast to the official 
[government] rhetoric of poverty reduction” (Tschakert and Singha, 2007: 1306).  
 
For these reasons the informal or illegal sector continues to predominate. The phenomenon of 
galamsey, used in Ghanaian parlance to refer to both the activity and the illicit miners 
themselves, is very much poverty-driven (Bush 2009) and described as “an economic 
necessity for those engaged in it” (Andrews 2015: 4). It is an activity undertaken by both men 
and women, generally with different roles, in very harsh working conditions (Andrews 2015: 
4), though one that can provide a “viable livelihood” (Tschakert 2009), especially for those 
established galamsey operators who themselves employ gangs of miners (Andrews 2015: 8). 
Mining methods have remained rudimentary, with limited mechanisation, at least until recent 
foreign involvement, as outlined below. There are occasional crackdowns by the state on 
illegal mining (Hilson and Yakovelva, 2007), yet often galamsey are able to operate relatively 
“freely and openly”, at least outside of mining company concessions, as noted by Andrews 
(2015: 11).  An instructive comment by Teschner (2012: 312) is that galamsey activities are so 
ubiquitous in places that “the casual observer may not believe that it could possibly be 
illegal”, leading him  to characterise galamsey as ‘alegal’, in other words “intentionally 
tolerated by law enforcement” (ibid.).4 While instances of traditional authorities (chiefs) 
personally profiting from illicit land allocations to (Ghanaian) galamsey operators have been 
reported (Hilson et al., 2014: 301),  neither the media nor academic literature has highlighted 
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corruption amongst public officials in relation to galamsey operations, probably because such 
activities have been mainly perceived as poverty-driven with limited opportunities for 
financial benefit from rent-seeking.  
 
The second key element of the legal framework of relevance here is that licensed small-scale 
mining can only be undertaken by citizens of Ghana, as outlined in the Minerals and Mining 
Act 2006 (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2006: sec 83). Here there has also been some 
disjuncture between the law and the reality on the ground, with non-Ghanaian miners 
involved in galamsey activities. Yet until recently such ‘foreigners’ were almost entirely from 
neighbouring West African countries, for instance Burkina Faso and Togo, with miners having 
migrated across porous borders in search of economic opportunities. This situation changed 
dramatically in the last decade with the influx of large numbers of foreign miners into the 
small-scale sector, most notably from China. 
 
3. The new gold rush and foreign involvement: conflict and collusion 
Until about ten years ago, two points could be made with certainty about artisanal gold 
mining in Ghana. First, it was a traditional activity, often involving the same rudimentary 
means of extraction (pick axe, shovel and bowl) that had been used for centuries. Second, it 
was almost entirely an indigenous activity, apart from those few miners from neighbouring 
countries. However, the last decade has seen rapid and interrelated changes to both these 
aspects. Foreign miners from China and other faraway places started coming to Ghana to 
engage in small-scale gold mining from 2006 onwards, which turned into a gold rush with the 
hike in gold prices from 2008. It was stated by an immigration officer (Interview 16) that 
many Chinese miners came into Ghana via Togo who had a ‘no visa required’ arrangement 
with China, and then crossed the border unofficially, while others came in on tourist visas. 
The exact numbers of such irregular migrants is not known, precisely due to the evasion of 
immigration laws, but it can be safely stated that the large majority were from China and that 
they numbered in the tens of thousands – a Chinese media source said fifty thousand (South 
China Morning Post, 7 July 2013) - with most coming from Shanglin County in Guangxi 
province and known in Ghana as the ‘Shanglin gang’. It is worth recalling that all such 
irregular migrants were working on an illicit and illegal basis given that the sector is reserved 
for Ghanaian citizens by law. How did such large numbers of foreign miners, particularly 
from China, come to be involved in ASM in Ghana, especially given its illegality? This 
section seeks to understand how this phenomenon occurred, as well as examine the media and 
state responses that led eventually to the creation of the government Task Force. 
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In seeking to explain this huge influx of Chinese miners into the ASM sector, this research 
identified both contingency and structural factors. The main contingency factor was a meeting 
in 2006 between a Chinese national, resident in Ghana and involved in the small-scale mining 
sector, and a Chinese miner from Guangxi province. This led to the introduction of the 
‘trommel’ machine, or wash plant, for use in alluvial gold mining (Interview 8). It vastly 
increased the grams of gold that could be extracted on a daily basis. Each machine required a 
team of 8 workers to operate in a collaborative manner, and therefore groups of 8 Chinese 
migrants started to come into the country. A key structural factor was the rapid rise in the 
world market price of gold from 2010 onwards, reaching over US$1400 per ounce by 
November 2010.5 This meant that large sums of money were being made by Chinese miners 
in Ghana, and news spread quickly by word-of-mouth back in China, particularly in Shanglin 
County where that technique had been used for more than 30 years. As the gold price 
continued to rise, reaching $1900 per ounce in September 2011 and remaining at over $1700 
per ounce throughout 2012, Chinese miners flocked to Ghana in their thousands and their 
presence became ubiquitous in the main areas of small-scale alluvial gold mining in southern 
Ghana. Another structural factor was the economic boom in China which made it possible for 
lower income Chinese citizens to borrow sums of USD 25,000 from the bank, providing 
groups of 8 Chinese nationals with approximately USD 200,000 for investment in ASM 
activities in Ghana (Interview 8).  
 
Competition over valuable resources can lead to conflict, especially where relatively poor 
local people may feel their livelihoods are under threat from foreign incomers, and indeed this 
was the case in this instance. Violent disturbances between local villagers and Chinese miners 
were increasingly reported from mid-2012 onwards, including incidents where Chinese 
miners were armed with guns.6  However, it was the death of a Chinese boy in October 2012 
in a police raid on illegal miners that drew international attention to this issue, with the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry demanding an investigation by the Government of Ghana (BBC 
News 15 October 2012). Other incidents included two Chinese miners being shot dead in an 
attempted robbery at a mining site on new year’s eve 2012 (Daily Guide, 4 January 2013).7 In 
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 It is a matter of fact that many Chinese miners (illegally) armed themselves with 
guns – a Chinese respondent stated that they had weapons “from the very beginning”. 
This was seen as justified in order to protect themselves in often isolated mining sites 
in the bush. The same Chinese respondent also stated that the Chinese response would 
be to seek compromise where violence was threatened. (Interview 6). 
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 “Two Chinese miners were allegedly shot and killed when suspected armed robbers 
stormed their camp at Nkoranza, near Subin in the Upper Denkyira West District of 
8 
 
February 2013, three Ghanaian youths from Manso Abodum community were shot and 
wounded allegedly by a Chinese miner in a mining dispute. 
 
However, this account of local conflicts only tells part of the story. How could tens of 
thousands of Chinese and other foreign nationals be working in an industry that, by law, is 
restricted to Ghanaian citizens, especially with the introduction of heavy machinery such as 
excavators and bulldozers, highly conspicuous in rural areas? Further, how could Chinese 
miners in particular operate in a country that is so different from their own? Most notably, 
how did they get access to land on which to undertake mining? It appears that collaboration 
and collusion in illegality occurred from local to national levels, within both official circles 
and society at large.  
In a somewhat different account from that of the immigration officer (above), we were told by 
a source who worked with Chinese miners that, on entry into the country, bogus visas and 
work permits were issued unlawfully to some Chinese miners by corrupt immigration officials 
for a fee; (and that these same officials later declared the same documents to be fake when the 
Chinese were arrested during the Task Force operations) (Interview 9). We were informed that 
irregular Chinese migrants from Shanglin County were relatively poor people, not highly 
educated, and rarely able to speak any English (Interview 8). They were unfamiliar with 
Ghanaian culture and traditions, especially regarding land ownership, and clearly required 
guidance and assistance in entering local communities, especially in interactions with local 
chiefs. The phrase that ‘the Chinese were led by Ghanaians’ was one repeatedly heard in our 
fieldwork, and in rural areas that invariably means being led to the local chief. The role of 
chiefs is crucial to facilitate illicit mining, given their traditional role over land transactions. 
Accounts of chiefs disbursing land to Chinese miners for significant sums of money, despite 
not having the right to sell customary land, as well as allegations of official corruption, were 
recurring themes (Focus groups 1 and 2). A Minerals Commission official (Interview 4) 
indicated that chiefs were almost always paid off by the Chinese through local Ghanaians 
fronting for them. Indeed, it was noted that the chiefs have to give final clearance for lands 
                                                                                                                                            
the Central Region on Monday- New Year's eve. Li Jian Sheng, believed to be in his 
late 40s, and Li Chao Hua, 35, worked with Hansol Small Scale Mining Company as 
senior consultants” (Daily Guide 4.01.13). In its report, the Daily Guide stated that 
“The Ghana-China Friendship Union (GCFU) put the figures of Chinese nationals 
killed by armed robbers at the mining sites at 87” (Daily Guide 4.01.13, cited in 
Modern Ghana 4.01.13). While such attacks undoubtedly occurred, this figure of 87 
deaths of Chinese nationals remains unconfirmed and uncorroborated, and would 
seem to be an exaggeration, given that such high numbers of armed robbery and 
deaths would have been extensively covered in the Ghanaian media. 
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before mining can take place, and this involved financial payments. However, the respondent 
also noted that the chiefs invariably deny their involvement, and, since no receipts are given 
to cover these payments, it is difficult to prove that they actually took place, providing a 
convenient basis for denials. In addition, the same respondent cited instances where conflicts 
erupted when community members accused chiefs of taking money from the Chinese miners, 
and allowing them to destroy their farms in illegal mining operations, while not sharing any 
of the money with community members as compensation. On some occasions, the locals 
directly attacked the Chinese miners for destroying the farms after paying off only the chiefs 
(Interview 4).  
A further level of collusion entailed close collaboration between Chinese miners and 
Ghanaian miners.  A former galamsey miner (Interview 17) indicated that the Chinese and 
local miners, both licensed concession holders and those involved in galamsey activities, 
worked together in various ways. First, it was often local galamsey miners who ‘led’ the 
Chinese to the chiefs and facilitated the bribes paid to the chiefs to secure illicit access to 
lands. Second, a common practice by licensed miners was to form a partnership with Chinese 
miners, to whom they effectively (and unlawfully) sub-let their concessions, taking between 
10-15 per cent of the value of the gold produced, while the Chinese who finance and 
undertake the entire mining operations took 85-90 per cent. Such deals were very lucrative 
and two registered small-scale miners who had worked with Chinese miners stated that a 15 
per cent stake amounted to an income of 15,000 to 25,000 Ghana cedis per week 
(approximately £3000 to £5000 per week) (interviews 10 & 11). The former interviewee was 
still engaged in such an arrangement, one year after the Task Force. Third, official registration 
of ASM mining licenses was undertaken by Ghanaians on behalf of the Chinese; 
consequently, when some Chinese were arrested, the documents bore Ghanaian names but the 
actual owners and operators were Chinese nationals. This latter practice also questions the 
role of Minerals Commission officials in scrutinising the registration and licensing processes 
for which they are responsible.  
It became evident that the influx of Chinese miners into small-scale gold mining in Ghana, 
and the new methods that they introduced, did not simply lead to conflict over resources, as 
was reported in newspaper headlines, but also to significant levels of collaboration with 
Ghanaians. Such collaboration was particularly attractive when large sums of money could be 
made very quickly, given the combination of more efficient extraction methods and the very 
high price of gold, and many Ghanaians in authority were keen to take advantage of their 
positions either to facilitate Chinese mining, through provision of access to land, or to allow 
illegal mining to occur through ‘turning a blind eye’ in return for financial inducements. 
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These issues of corruption by both state officials and traditional authorities are highlighted 
below. 
 
State and media response 
While the presence of Chinese miners in the ASM sector grew exponentially, especially from 
2010 onwards, the Government of Ghana did very little for a number of years.  However, 
from mid-2012 onwards, the participation of Chinese nationals in informal mining in Ghana 
had grown to such proportions that there was extensive reporting of the issue of ‘illegal 
Chinese miners’ in the Ghanaian media, almost entirely negative. This research undertook a 
review of relevant coverage from January to September 2013 in three local mass media 
outlets, the Daily Graphic newspaper, and two web portals – Expose Ghana and Modern 
Ghana – each of which contains news items from a range of print and TV/radio sources. 
Within this period, Modern Ghana had 48 relevant stories, the Daily Graphic had 36, and 
Expose Ghana had 44, almost all negative. The media increasingly put pressure on the 
government to act, highlighting the local conflicts between Ghanaian and Chinese miners, 
with firearms involved and deaths and injuries on both sides, and the widespread 
environmental destruction that was resulting from the use of heavy machinery. The despair 
about government inaction was reflected in an article in early 2013 in the Daily Graphic, the 
most established newspaper, with the headline ‘Deal with illegal miners now’, stating: “As we 
look on in helpless amazement, foreigners continue to degrade our lands and pollute our water 
bodies” (15.03.13). However, the media was also responsible for some xenophobia against 
Chinese miners (Tschakert 2016) and for the scapegoating of foreigners for problems that had 
much wider origins within the national landscape, as discussed below. Chinese miners were 
referred to as “illegal, undesirable migrants” (Daily Graphic 29/03/13), “deviants” (Daily 
Graphic 25/02/13), “aliens” (Daily Graphic 05/03/13), who hunt for “easy riches” in Ghana 
(Modern Ghana 12/06/13). Their presence in Ghana and involvement in small-scale gold-
mining was labelled as an “invasion” (Expose Ghana 18/03/13), a “menace” (Daily Graphic 
19/06/13), and a threat to the lives of indigenous people (Modern Ghana 11/05/13). Little 
information was provided on the Chinese miners themselves or their motivations for 
becoming involved in small-scale mining in Ghana. We found no stories providing the 
‘Chinese side of the story’.8  
                                                 
8 In another interesting study of Ghanaian perceptions of Chinese migrants, undertaken by a Chinese 
postgraduate researcher, Liu Shaonan, it was similarly noted that coverage of Chinese miners in the 
Daily Graphic during May-June 2013 was entirely negative in tone and used the word ‘illegal’ in all 22 
stories (Liu 2014).  The author states that the narrative of the reports created an impression that ‘illegal 
Chinese miners’ were responsible for “land degradation, water pollution, robbery and shooting, the loss 
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Media coverage of illegal mining activities, especially those involving foreign miners, 
coupled with the incidents of local conflict and protests from local youths, farmers, mining 
activists and environmental groups, became extremely difficult to ignore, and at times 
bordered on portraying the inability of the state security services to deal with the situation. 
For example, on 28 February 2013, the Daily Graphic reported the drowning of two naval 
officers in the river Pra while chasing illegal miners, with President Mahama visiting their 
families. On 16 April 2013, the Daily Graphic and several private radio and television stations 
across the country reported the death of 17 illegal Ghanaian miners who were trapped to death 
when a mine collapsed, one allegedly abandoned by Chinese illegal miners, This was a major 
tragedy that questioned the effectiveness of state institutions such as the Minerals 
Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, immigration and the security services. The 
media coverage, including in local languages on radio and television, with live pictures from 
mining sites, galvanised public outrage against the illegal mining activities, and made it 
nearly impossible for the government to ignore. Thus finally the government was forced to 
act. On 15 May 2013, President Mahama acknowledged that “We do clearly have a problem” 
and established a high-level Inter-Ministerial Task Force to combat illegal small-scale mining. 
While the President was careful to include all illegal mining activities in its remit, the sub-text 
was clear that this was a measure primarily aimed at foreign miners, especially Chinese 
nationals. The Task Force was essentially a military operation undertaken by the army and 
police, referred to as the ‘flushing out’ of illegal miners, and led to the official deportation of 
4592 Chinese nationals as well as smaller numbers of other foreign nationals, as noted above 
(Modern Ghana, 12/07/2013). The ferocity of the military crackdown targeted at foreign 
miners, with the burning of mining equipment and facilities, meant that many more Chinese 
miners fled from the country. It is also notable that no Ghanaian miners were arrested or 
prosecuted. 
 
Although the scale of foreign involvement in ASM has declined post-Task Force, we argue 
here that this short but intense episode of foreign involvement, especially the role of Chinese 
miners, has brought about significant and irreversible changes in this traditional economic 
sector. We briefly examine these consequences below, including the implications for the state, 
                                                                                                                                            
of national wealth and a breakdown of Ghanaian law”, with no mention of Ghanaian counterparts or 
collaborators (Liu 2014: 3). The focus on the Chinese miners as separate actors, disconnected from 
their Ghanaian collaborators at various levels of Ghanaian society and government, entails dangers of 
misrepresentation and the scapegoating of foreigners for national problems.  
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before turning to seek an explanation for why unlawful activity on such a scale and with such 
a significant impact was able, and indeed allowed, to occur. 
 
4. Outcomes of foreign involvement in ASM 
Over a short period from 2008-2013, the impact of this remarkable phenomenon of 
widespread illicit Chinese involvement in ASM has been highly significant. This section 
looks at some of the outcomes. 
 
Mechanisation and Intensification 
Most significantly, Chinese involvement has led to a mechanisation and intensification of 
production that has transformed the small-scale mining sector, with many Ghanaian miners, 
both concession holders and galamsey, now employing the same techniques. Such changes 
are irreversible and the sector, or at least a significant part of it, can no longer be described as 
artisanal. Areas of land are now mined in weeks that previously would have taken years using 
the traditional methods, and the amount of land that is acquired from land owners, often 
illicitly from traditional authorities (the chiefs), for mining purposes has increased 
enormously (Interview 10). This is also the major cocoa growing region, based on small-scale 
farming, and land use changes have significant implications for cocoa production and 
livelihoods. A local registered small-scale miner informed us that the Chinese offered more 
money for cocoa farms than the local ASM operators (Interview 11). For example, whereas 
locals offered GHC 8,000 for an acre of cocoa farm to be cut down for mining, the Chinese 
would offer more than GHC 15, 000 for the same acre of cocoa farm. It is also instructive to 
note that the average cocoa farmer in the area may make just about GHC 1,000 from an acre 
per year. Thus, it was very attractive for many poor farmers to sell off their farms for cash, 
and many were willing to do so.  
The intensification of gold production as a result of these activities is reflected in the 
phenomenal increase in the contribution of small-scale gold mining to total gold production. 
Production has increased 7-fold from 225,411 ounces in 2005 to 1,576,478 ounces in 2013, 
while the percentage of total gold production from small-scale mining has also increased from 
11% in 2005 to a remarkable 36% in 2013 and 2014 (Minerals Commission 2014).  This 
increase has been particularly marked in the period from 2008 onwards corresponding with 
the rapid escalation of Chinese miners migrating to Ghana from Shanglin County, culminating 
in the huge leaps in production during the gold boom in 2012 and the first half of 2013, when 
tens of thousands of Chinese miners were active in the sector.  
 
Environmental Degradation 
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Second, a consequence of mechanization and the intensification of production has been much 
larger-scale environmental degradation in areas of alluvial mining, inclusive of both land and 
water bodies. The rush to acquire land for mining has meant that large tracts of arable land 
have been destroyed, most notably where illegal mining has entailed sites being abandoned 
without any reclamation, and will remain unusable for farming for generations. Loss of farm 
lands has affected both cocoa production and food crop production, with an adverse effect on 
both food security and the country’s foreign currency earnings.  Abandoned pits are left 
uncovered and become flooded, posing a danger to local residents, especially children, with 
deaths reported. The destruction of river systems has been a new and catastrophic form of 
environmental degradation that has occurred precisely due to the introduction of dredging 
mining within rivers by Chinese miners and subsequently adopted by Ghanaian miners. Main 
rivers are now severely polluted, with high levels of water turbidity, loss of aquatic life, and 
contaminated drinking water. The degree of water pollution has very severe consequences for 
local communities, including those served with piped water, increasing the cost of chemical 
treatment to make such water potable (CSIR – Water Research Institute, 2013). 
 
Lost revenue 
However, despite the increase in total gold production, mining that is largely unlawful means 
that significant opportunities for revenue collection by the state are being lost. It has become 
difficult to trace how gold is traded and exported, with suggestions that gold was smuggled 
out of the country.  A knowledgeable respondent at national level stated that this is “a widely-
held view” (Interview 2), while a licensed concession holder who had worked with Chinese 
miners in Dunkwa-on-Offin alleged that “gold was sent direct to China” with “so many ways” 
of doing so (Interview 11). Clearly illegal foreign miners pay no taxes, nor do unlawful 
galamsey operators.  
 
Legal impunity 
Despite various elements of illegality in foreign involvement in ASM, the law was not 
enforced prior to the Task Force. Unlawful activities include: foreign purchase of small-scale 
concessions from Ghanaians; mining on unregistered land often acquired from chiefs; mining 
in rivers; gold smuggling; and the basic illegality of non-Ghanaians undertaking any small-
scale mining. While there has been a degree of state tolerance towards galamsey activities in 
the past, as noted above, the scale of illegality became much greater with foreign 
involvement. In alluvial mining in the South, the situation prior to the Task Force had 
escalated to the extent that it was described by the senior environmental official as “out of 
control” with a “culture of impunity” (Interview 1). Another Ghanaian respondent, who had 
himself worked with Chinese miners, confirmed this by noting that mining was being 
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undertaken collaboratively by Chinese and Ghanaians in a “free-range” manner (Interview 9), 
with little or no respect for the law by those mining or, disturbingly, by the relevant 
authorities responsible for its enforcement. Although foreign involvement has decreased post-
Task Force, the fact that it was allowed to develop and reach such proportions raises 
fundamental questions about the Ghanaian state. It is also the case that the Task Force was a 
one-off crackdown targeted at foreign miners, and subsequently Ghanaian miners have 
continued to undertake illegal operations, such as mining in rivers, with relative impunity, as 
observed during fieldwork and has continued to date. 
 
5. Explaining outcomes: Corruption, informality, neopatrimonialism and 
neoliberalisation  
 
How do we explain such outcomes? Why was this culture of impunity allowed to develop and 
why did it take so long for government to act? Where was the state in this context and what 
does this episode tell us about the character of the Ghanaian state? In seeking an explanation 
from the data from interviews and focus group discussions, it becomes evident that the range 
of unlawful activities outlined above and the failure of various state authorities to enforce the 
law was underpinned by widespread state corruption. This section commences by outlining 
the evidence that indicates the behind-the-scenes presence of the state, not its absence, in 
facilitating this episode up to and including the Task Force’s activities. Yet disappointing as it 
may be, the corrupt and rent-seeking behaviour of state officials in Africa is hardly a 
revelation, and the explanation needs to be taken further. What are the underlying processes 
that have led to a situation where illegal practices are effectively enabled by those in 
authority, rather than being prevented from occurring? We identify broader interrelated 
factors, mainly based on insights from existing literature. The first focuses on the concept of 
informality, both as it affects the ASM sector and the state itself. The second factor locates 
corruption and informality within the concept of the neopatrimonial state in Africa, and then 
examines how neopatrimonialism has evolved and adapted in the face of the third factor, 
neoliberal state reconstruction and the marketization of social relations. 
 
Institutional failure and corruption 
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Various authorities failed in their responsibilities, both traditional authorities and government 
agencies, including the immigration service, the Minerals Commission, the police, and 
regional and local government. Why has such pervasive institutional failure occurred? The 
endemic nature of corruption would seem to be central to any answer. The Ghanaian state is 
not a weak state, as was evident when the Task Force was eventually put in place. Yet this 
example has also shown that it is a state, like others in sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
increasingly characterised by pervasive ‘everyday corruption’ and the rent-seeking behaviour 
of public officials (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  
 
During fieldwork, we were constantly hearing stories of various individuals taking bribes and 
being bought off. We noted above the allegations made against Ghana Immigration Service 
officials that they provided entry permits and (false) work permits to Chinese miners for 
payments (interview 9). Corruption allegations were also made against many other 
government officials ranging from local government level to high-ranking central government 
personnel, including Ministers of State and Members of Parliament who were involved in 
shielding illegal Chinese miners in exchange for financial contributions, notably for electoral 
campaigns. Lone voices in the public sector who had tried to take action against illegal 
mining operations informed us that Chinese miners in particular were protected by “big shots 
in government” in return for payments (Interview 14). This individual cited two instances in 
his direct experience that indicated high-level government complicity in illegality. First, he 
stated that when attempting to challenge some Chinese miners that they had made phone calls 
and consequently he had been “threatened on the phone by [Ghanaian] big men” and told “to 
lay off the Chinese”.  Second, when trying to get some Chinese nationals to register their 
businesses for local taxation purposes, he stated that the local office of the Ghana 
Immigration Service had warned him to stop as “they [Immigration] had instructions”. He 
intimated that various politicians were protecting the Chinese, especially at the time of the 
2012 general election campaign in return for financial support to sponsor their campaigns. A 
licensed small-scale miner, who himself had worked with Chinese miners, confirmed these 
experiences. He stated that, if challenged, the Chinese would “threaten to call the Minister or 
police commander”. He further alleged that, “People here in Dunkwa can never arrest Chinese 
people as they have top guys supporting them; they just need to make a phone call”. He 
expressed the view that such “top guys” were “collecting their money every week from the 
Chinese” (Interview 11).  
Such accusations were corroborated by a Chinese respondent with first-hand experience of 
incoming Chinese miners as business clients (Interview 6). He noted that “money talks” and 
Chinese miners had made payments to both high-level government officials and those at 
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ground level, with the latter also expected to channel money to senior officials. He alleged 
that “many [government] people were involved”, including officials from key government 
agencies, and that they had effectively provided protection to Chinese miners. Yet post-Task 
Force, he noted that a fundamental shift had occurred and Chinese miners were “no longer 
protected by the [Ghanaian] government”, and therefore most had moved on to other 
countries in the region or returned to China (Interview 6). Those that remained appeared to 
fall into two main categories.  A few more established Chinese miners opened up equipment 
hire businesses for Ghanaian small-scale miners, as we observed, while others were reported 
to have moved deeper into the bush to escape the Task Force, especially more recent arrivals 
with insufficient earnings to flee the country (Interview 9). It is difficult to ascertain the exact 
number of Chinese miners in Ghana today due to the low profile post-Task Force, but it is a 
small fraction compared with , the very large numbers in 2012 and 2013. 
 
Although the Inter-Ministerial Task Force temporarily reduced this free-for-all ravaging of 
Ghana’s gold resources, the allegations of corruption also extended to the Task Force itself. 
Significant payments by Chinese miners to Task Force members in order to avoid arrest were 
reported, as well as the theft of gold and property from Chinese miners, in the course of the 
military-style crackdown. A local journalist involved in reporting the Task Force’s activities 
indicated that members of the Task Force made a lot of money from the operations, 
sometimes as much as GHC 10,000 per person per day (Interview 12).  Money was extorted 
from the Chinese in return for their release, with much of this money siphoned off 
immediately through the mobile money system during the operations. In addition, many of the 
items left behind by escaping Chinese such as gold, vehicles and mining equipment were 
stolen by some members of the Task Force. Indeed, we were told that those Chinese who were 
arrested and deported were precisely those who “could not pay” (Interview 12). 
It would appear that foreign miners, especially from China, were able to operate with 
impunity for so long precisely because they were protected by those in authority, that is, by 
public officials, politicians and chiefs, in return for private payments. Various state 
institutions have clearly failed in their responsibilities to maintain the law. Yet this is not due 
to issues of inadequate capacity. Rather public officials have ‘turned a blind eye’ to illicit 
mining in return for a share in the large sums of money being made from gold extraction. 
Similarly chiefs have seen an opportunity for personal gain by selling land for mining, despite 
their traditional role prohibiting this. Those in public positions, including traditional 
authorities, have become increasingly oriented to pursuing private wealth accumulation rather 
than public service in a manner that undermines any notion of state effectiveness. 
Significantly, corrupt behaviour and opportunism was even evident in the Task Force’s 
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activities, charged with ending illegal mining, with army and police personnel taking 
advantage of their power to pursue private gain at the expense of the Chinese miners. 
 
Informality 
Corruption takes different forms in different contexts, and Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
(2006) have emphasised the significance of the concept of ‘informality’ in their detailed study 
of everyday corruption in three countries in francophone West Africa. A key finding in their 
study was that ‘the “real” function of the state is very removed from its “official functioning”’ 
(2006, p. 5) in terms of laws and regulations. They describe this ‘real’ function as the 
‘generalized informal functioning’ of the state (ibid.), which facilitates corrupt practices and 
private accumulation by public officials. In other words, the state does not exist merely to 
provide public services for its citizens, its official function. Rather, its ‘informal functioning’ 
enables public officials to make use of their positions in various ways to secure private 
financial benefits. Such ‘informal functioning’ of the state is evident here, tied up with 
corrupt practices, and provides a clue to understanding the nature of the relationship between 
Chinese migrant miners and Ghanaian power holders in this study. Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan’s (2006) focus on the ‘informal functioning’ of the state is also closely linked to the 
concept of the neopatrimonial state, discussed below. 
 
However, the relevance of the concept of informality extends further in the context of small-
scale mining. The ability of power holders to engage in corrupt practices is reinforced by the 
informality of the small-scale mining sector itself, enabling state officials to disregard existing 
laws and regulations, and for both Ghanaian and Chinese miners to operate with impunity. It 
should be recalled that small-scale mining in Ghana is characterised by illicitness and 
irregularity. This is evident in the whole phenomenon of the galamsey, replicated in other 
African countries such as Burkina Faso and Mozambique (Andrews, 2015, p. 6) where illicit 
mining is often tolerated and mining laws not enforced (Teschner, 2012; Fisher, 2007). 
Therefore the informality of the ASM sector provides fertile ground for bribery and 
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corruption, more so than the formalised large-scale mining sector. This has previously been 
most evident in relation to chiefs, who exploit their power to gain personal financial benefit 
from illicit small-scale mining within their territories. Although traditional authorities have no 
formal role in the licensing of small-scale mining operations, their authoritative position in 
local communities means that they cannot be by-passed and generally their approval must be 
sought before mining can be undertaken, albeit informally and at a price (Hilson et al., 2014, 
p. 301). This ability of power holders to use their position for rent-seeking purposes has 
extended to state officials in the case of Chinese mining operations, especially in the context 
of the latest gold rush where stakes are much higher given that the volume of gold extracted 
was vastly increased and no longer merely a poverty-driven occupation. 
 
In all, the informality of the ASM sector, combined with the ‘generalized informal 
functioning’ of the state (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 2006, p. 5), has enabled illicit and 
unlawful activities to occur with relative impunity, especially where those tasked with 
upholding the law are privately benefiting from the law’s non-enforcement. This informality 
is also an expression of the ASM sector’s relative neglect by the state, described by Van 
Bockstael (2014) as ‘the persistence of informality’ in small-scale mining in Liberia, and by 
Hilson et al. (2014, p. 292) as the sector’s ‘perpetual informality’ in Ghana. It can be argued 
that this continued neglect is intentional and an unofficial policy, given the private benefits to 
be gained. 
 
Neopatrimonialism 
Informality and corruption are often identified as key characteristics of the neopatrimonial 
state, commonly regarded as the key descriptor of the post-colonial state in Africa, following 
Medard’s (1982) application of the concept to the continent. Indeed, Bratton and van de Walle 
regard neopatrimonialism as “the core feature of politics in Africa” (1994: 459, emphasis in 
original), and identified some 40 African states where routinized neopatrimonialism can be 
observed, including Ghana.  In their review article, Erdmann and Engel define 
neopatrimonialism as “a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: 
namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination” (2007: 105), based on two of 
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Max Weber’s three types of authority, that is traditional authority and legal-rational authority. 
In other words, neopatrimonialism combines and infuses together the traditional authority of 
patrimonial rule, characterised by personal rule with little or no differentiation between the 
private and public realms, and Weber’s ideal-type of the legal-rational bureaucracy that 
characterises the modern state, where authority is based on laws and rule-bound institutions 
and a clear distinction is upheld between office and office-holder. Therefore neopatrimonial 
states do have formal legal-rational structures and rules, with a claim to “modern stateness” 
(Erdmann and Engel 2007: 105), yet this is often regarded as a façade behind which the 
informal patrimonial relations operate and the distinction between private and public interests 
becomes blurred, chiming with Blundo and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) distinction between the 
official and informal functioning of the state. In particular the neopatrimonial state is 
characterised by clientelism (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Erdmann and Engel 2007), the 
hierarchical network of patron-client relations that stretches from the presidential ‘big man’ 
downwards to the “humblest village assembly” (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 459). In a 
cyclical and self-perpetuating way, clientelist systems use state power and public resources as 
the means to disburse patronage in the form of jobs, contracts and financial perks, 
traditionally to kinship and ethnic groups and more latterly to political party supporters, in 
order to generate loyalty and thus to maintain power and control over the resources required 
for patronage purposes. This “privatizing [of] public resources for personal gain or gain by 
ethnic communities” (Kohli, 2004: 289, cited in Bach 2011: 282) is referred to as “the 
‘privatization of the state’ in Africa” by Lindberg (2003: 123). Nigeria is often seen as “a 
near-perfect example of such a neopatrimonial state model” (Bach 2011: 282) while Kohli 
considered the concept relevant to describe ‘almost all’ African states (2004: 394–395, cited 
in Bach 2011: 282).  
 
In many respects, characteristics of the neopatrimonial state are what we continue to observe 
here. Formal rules and public bureaucracies do “exist and matter”, but the reality of the 
neopatrimonial regime is that “informal rules and norms take precedence over formal 
institutions” (Guliyev 2011: 578). In this case, a formal legal framework regulating small-
scale mining exists along with state institutions to uphold the law, yet it is a legal framework 
that has limited functionality, and often acts as a pretence behind which informal and at times 
illegal practices operate. The (ab)use of private office for private gain that we have observed 
in this study also corresponds largely to the description of contemporary neopatrimonialism 
where “leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire 
personal wealth and status” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994: 458, cited in Bach 2011: 277). Yet 
what we observe here is also different from classic neopatrimonialism where it is access to 
state resources that is crucial and where such resources are used mainly for patronage 
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purposes. While the distinction between public and private interests continues to be blurred in 
the contemporary situation in Ghana, there are two significant differences. One is that state 
position (or traditional authority) is exploited to gain access to private sector resources. The 
other is that this is undertaken in an individualised manner for personal enrichment, less 
strongly connected to clientelist networks and patronage politics. These are significant 
changes and seeking to account for the ways in which neopatrimonialism has evolved leads us 
to explore the impact of neoliberal state reconstruction and the marketization of social 
relations. 
 
Neoliberal state reconstruction  
If neopatrimonialism has been “the core feature of politics in Africa” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1994: 459, emphasis in original), then it is also indisputable that the dominant 
paradigm of neoliberalism has also resulted in momentous changes to the state in Africa over 
the past two decades. As Leftwich (1994: 368) noted over two decades ago, “neo-liberalism is 
not only an economic theory but a political one as well”. Subsequently the work of Harrison 
has been notable for an analysis of how the ideas and practices of neoliberalism have been 
responsible for the reconstruction of the post-independence state in Africa into a pro-market 
state (Harrison, 2004, pp. 3-5), under the tutelage of the World Bank. The expectations of 
such a pro-market state, at least amongst its advocates such as the World Bank, is that 
neopatrimonial processes would be undermined through the diminishment of available state 
resources and their use becoming increasingly subject to greater transparency and 
accountability, with the latter achieved through the governance conditionality attached to aid 
by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions as well as the domestic pressure for greater 
democratisation and the rule of law.  In such ways, neoliberal state reconstruction was 
anticipated to bring about a reduction in corrupt activities by state officials. Yet, on the 
contrary, it can be argued from the evidence here that while neoliberal state reconstruction led 
to adaptations in the nature of neopatrimonialism, it has not been weakened or corruption 
diminished. 
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Hibou (2004) articulates such changes convincingly in her discussion of neoliberalism and 
‘privatising the state’, with particular reference to Africa. Her argument is that the 
‘privatisation of the state’ is not synonymous with ‘the retreat of the state’ (2004: 15), as is 
more commonly associated with the neoliberal project. Rather, the concept refers to a 
different way of exercising state power (ibid.: xvi) in which state actors have adjusted to the 
prevailing neoliberal discourse and to changes to public-private sphere relations, but in a 
manner that retains state control, albeit more indirectly, and, significantly, enhances their 
ability to pursue private interests. According to Hibou, this concept of the privatisation of the 
state has taken a range of different forms in different countries, but two common 
characteristics are the expanded role of the private sector in the economic sphere, and the 
increased closeness of links between political power and private actors in undertaking and 
profiting from such economic activities. For Hibou (2004), this is not a weakening of the 
state; rather, it can amount to its reinforcement or strengthening, at least for state personnel, 
both officials and politicians, (if not for the mass of the populace who suffer in terms of the 
delivery of public goods and services) (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006: 109).  
 
One aspect of the state becoming stronger is the increased hold by political personnel and 
state officials over the informal economy (Hibou 1999, cited in Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 
2006: 109), notably in circumstances where key components of the formal economy are taken 
out of state control and privatised, as happened with large-scale gold mining in Ghana (Hilson 
and Yakovleva 2007: 102-105). Indeed Hibou (2004: 12) precisely argues that the state has 
contributed to the development of informal and illegal activities by its tolerance towards them 
and the involvement of its members. This is exactly what appears to have occurred in this 
example in Ghana with state tolerance of illicit activities and the openness of state officials to 
acceptance of bribes. A key dimension of this “informal privatisation of the state” is state 
officials utilising the opportunity to undertake their “personal business” (Blundo & Olivier de 
Sardan, 2006, p. 109, citing Hibou, 1999) outside of their official roles and public capacities 
through their closeness to private sector economic activities. By such means state officials are 
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able to increase their private accumulation of wealth (ibid.), often through corrupt practices. 
Hibou (2004, pp. 4-10) provides numerous examples from sub-Saharan African countries of 
this privatisation of government and the need to pay attention to the “behind-the-scenes 
relations” (ibid., p. 4), including how a country’s economic resources are increasingly 
appropriated by private actors, in alliance with state personnel in search of new economic 
opportunities (ibid., p.  6). Such analysis both underscores the continued operation of 
neopatrimonial structures and relations, while noting that neoliberal restructuring has also led 
to changes in the ways by which state officials (ab)use their public position for individual 
personal gain through interaction with the private sector. She talks of the “constant 
negotiation” between public and private actors and the “lack of a precise boundary between 
what is punished and what is allowed, between what is authorised, tolerated and condemned, 
between licit and illicit” (ibid.: 16). Such negotiations and lack of certainty serve to enhance 
the arbitrary power of state actors in interactions with private sector actors, but also lead to a 
“toleration of private appropriation, illegal and criminal acts” (ibid.: 15).   
 
Clearly much of this analysis chimes with and serves to explain the processes demonstrated in 
this case study, where local power holders, including state officials, have colluded with 
foreign miners to allow highly profitable economic activities in an informal sector, despite the 
illegal nature of such activities, in return for illicit payments, and therefore, with state 
connivance, foreign miners were able to disregard the law that limits small-scale mining to 
Ghanaian citizens and prohibits foreign involvement. 
 
Hibou’s analysis, combined with that offered here, points to the interlinkages and mutual 
reinforcement between neoliberal state reconstruction, informality and corruption in ways that 
increase illicit practices, not diminish them. In a related manner, it is also evident that 
neopatrimonial elements remain a central feature of Ghanaian politics in particular and 
African politics in general, while recognising how neopatrimonialism has adapted to the 
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pressures associated with neoliberal restructuring, with greater emphasis now on using 
political power to access private sector resources and for purposes of personal enrichment. 
 
Marketization of social relations 
Neoliberalisation also goes beyond economic and political systems, and extends into society 
and culture more generally, bringing about changes in social practices (Harrison, 2010, p. 29) 
that reflect the marketization of social relations and the privatisation of economic benefits. 
One feature of such neoliberal cultural changes in African societies is the process of “over-
monetisation” (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 2006, p. 106), where money becomes everything 
and obtaining money is the dominant theme in all activities and social relationships (see 
Wiegratz & Cesnulyte, 2016, for discussion in East Africa). This monetisation of society, and 
the prioritisation of making money for oneself, appeared to underpin the support provided by 
various state officials and traditional authorities to the incoming Chinese miners. In such a 
context, making money by whatever means, including illicit ones, predominates the 
interactions between informal private sector actors and the state, with little concern that the 
law is being flouted or that local conflict is being generated. The role of state officials and 
politicians as public servants is easily abandoned in the service of the private sector and their 
own self-interest, as is that of chiefs in their traditional role as ‘custodians of the land for the 
people’. The capture of benefits by individual power holders and the dysfunctionality of state 
institutions are thus outcomes of the unremitting spread of neoliberalisation in all its 
dimensions, with the strengthening not weakening of the neopatrimonial state and its ‘behind-
the- scenes’ corrupt and illicit practices. 
 
6. Conclusion  
We commenced this study by seeking to understand and explain the phenomenon of mass 
illicit foreign involvement in small-scale gold mining in Ghana, especially the tens of 
thousands of migrant miners from China, and our grounded approach meant that we then 
sought a wider explanation by situating our immediate findings within theories of the state in 
Africa. We asked the question: how and why was this phenomenon of pervasive Chinese 
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involvement able to occur, despite its illegality, without earlier intervention from the state? 
Our findings and conclusions are at two different levels: firstly, we summarise the impact of 
illicit foreign involvement on ASM in Ghana in the context of state failure to enforce the laws 
that regulate the sector; and secondly, we highlight what this has demonstrated about the 
nature of the contemporary state in Ghana and the implications for democratic governance. 
 
Despite the brevity of this episode, only a few years in the centuries-old history of small-scale 
gold mining in Ghana, its impact has been substantial and irreversible. Chinese involvement 
in particular has transformed the sector through the introduction of capital and machinery, 
including equipment for mining in rivers. This has led to a huge intensification of production 
on both small-scale concessions and unlicensed land, and areas of land are now mined in 
weeks that previously would have taken years using traditional methods. Such machinery and 
techniques have subsequently been adopted by some Ghanaian small-scale miners, notably 
concession holders, at first in partnership with Chinese miners, and now mainly without direct 
Chinese involvement, apart from equipment hire. Although Chinese miners have largely 
departed post-Task Force, small-scale mining for such Ghanaian operators will never be the 
same again and can no longer be regarded as artisanal given the degree of mechanisation. One 
positive consequence is that the economic significance of small-scale gold production is much 
greater, having increased in volume 7-fold from 2005 to 2013, and as a percentage of total 
gold production from 11% in 2005 to 36% in 2013. There are also significant negative 
consequences. One is the degree of environmental degradation from unregulated mining to 
both land and water bodies, and the incalculable cost to the state of land reclamation and 
restoration of water bodies. Another is the loss of tax revenue to the state from mining that 
was often illegal.  Therefore the effects on public finances are dire, faced with huge 
expenditure in reversing environmental destruction on the one hand, and the loss of tax 
revenue on the other, while those private individuals, both Ghanaian and foreign nationals, 
who benefited from the illegal extraction of gold have evaded all responsibility. Why did the 
state allow such negative outcomes to occur, including to its own finances? Indeed, where 
was the state while such fundamental transformations were occurring in the small-scale 
mining sector, given its formal role in regulating the sector? 
 
While it appeared that the state was largely absent during this rather dramatic period of mass 
illicit foreign incursion into small-scale mining, our findings are that the state, as well as 
traditional authority, was very much present and active during this episode, but in a corrupt 
and self-enriching manner. The abuse by many state officials, politicians and traditional chiefs 
of their positions of power and authority for purposes of private wealth accumulation is the 
key factor that accounts for why illicit and illegal activities involving foreign miners were 
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able to continue unchallenged for so long. Indeed we found that Chinese miners in particular 
were actually protected by state officials and politicians, at least until the time of the Task 
Force.  
 
Informality and attendant corruption were key themes that emerged from our empirical 
evidence and these are strongly associated with the neopatrimonial state, identified since the 
late 1970s as the main descriptor of the post-colonial state in Africa. Therefore one main 
conclusion is that the Ghanaian state remains essentially neopatrimonial in nature, where state 
officials exploit their public positions to pursue their private interests. Yet this requires further 
elucidation. Neopatrimonialism is dynamic not static, and its interactions with the external 
pressure for neoliberal state restructuring over the past three decades has resulted in changes 
in how it operates. Neoliberalism has not weakened the neopatrimonial state, as anticipated by 
its proponents. Rather evidence here suggests that neopatrimonialism has successfully 
adapted to a changed policy environment in three ways, and thus reinvigorated itself. First, 
neopatrimonial behaviour by officials now focuses more on accessing financial resources 
through interactions with private sector actors, including bribe-seeking and toleration of illicit 
and illegal activities in the informal sector, with little concern for adverse public 
consequences, for instance to the public finances or the environment. Second, the social 
dimension of neoliberalism, characterised by a culture of individualism and a moral economy 
where acquiring money is all, has been integrated into the neopatrimonial state and led to a 
shift in the purposes for which wealth is accumulated, now used more for private 
consumption and less for distribution to traditional patron-client networks. Third, one 
exception, however, is that the distribution of resources based on political party loyalty has 
become stronger, referred to as ‘competitive clientelist’ politics (Whitfield et al 2015; Abdulai 
and Hickey 2016), with the neopatrimonial state adapting to the demands of obligatory 
regular elections. This was evident in this study where politicians allegedly turned a blind eye 
to illicit activities in their constituencies in return for payments from illegal miners towards 
their re-election campaigns in the run-up to the December 2012 parliamentary elections. It is 
what Caselli and Michaels (2012) have referred to as “unproductive self-preservation” that is 
activities aimed at acquiring the finance necessary to win the next election, thus sustaining 
their ability to seek private financial benefits, and what Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012: 3), 
specifically in the Ghanaian context, have termed the “clientelization of the democratic 
politics”. 
 
This leads to a final point. Such findings cast a long shadow over the state and government in 
Ghana, including the role of traditional authorities, and tarnish its celebration as a model of 
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democratic governance for Africa. Liberal democracy is strongly linked to a legal-rational 
bureaucracy and the rule of law, and democratic consolidation would entail progress in this 
direction and an increasing separation of private and public roles. Yet the recent episode of 
foreign involvement in the small-scale gold mining sector has revealed opposite trends. The 
state in Ghana remains neopatrimonial in nature, characterised by its ‘informal functioning’ 
behind-the-scenes, and 25 years of regular elections and formal democracy does not appear to 
have diminished this. While legal-rational institutions exist, they remain weak and often serve 
to obscure the predominant informal and corrupt workings of the state.  The benefits of 
democracy for the people of Ghana are severely compromised where officials and politicians 
(ab)use their positions to enrich themselves rather than focus on the development and 
implementation of public policies in the interests of all.  
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